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RESUMEN: El Premio Nobel Hans Dehmelt aprisionó un positron, 
que fue llamado “Priscilla”. Dehmelt dijo que no podemos dudar de la 
identidad de Priscilla. Eso nos coloca un problema filosófico, puesto 
que aprendimos con la mecánica cuántica (en sus principales inter-
pretaciones) que los objetos cuánticos no deberían tener individuali-
dad. En este artículo, discutimos las cuestiones de nombrar los quanta 
y las cuestiones de la individuación. Conclúyenos que, a pesar de que 
Dehmelt nombró algo, ese algo no es un individuo.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Individuos; no-individuos; partículas aprisiona-
das; individualidad; identidad.
ABSTRACT: Nobel laureate Hans Dehmelt trapped a positron for 
three months, which was named “Priscilla”. Dehmelt said that we 
could not doubt the identity of Priscilla. This poses us a philosophical 
problem, for we have learnt from quantum physics (in most of its 
interpretations) that quantum objects shouldn’t have individuality. 
In this paper, we address on the questions of naming quanta and the 
issue of individuation. We conclude by saying that, although Dehmelt 
has named something, this something is not an individual.
KEY WORDS: Individuals; non-individuals; identity; quantum ob-
jects; trapped particles.
¿ES PRISCILLA, EL POSITRÓN 
ATRAPADO, UN INDIVIDUO? LA 
FÍSICA CUÁNTICA, EL USO DE 
NOMBRES Y LA INDIVIDUACIÓN
1.  INDIVIDUALS AND NON-INDIVIDUALS
It is quite difficult to write down a precise definition of 
what would be an individual. Here, we are interested in 
using this term to refer to individual (physical) objects, 
in distinction to both mass and kind terms, leaving aside 
other possibilities. Informally, an individual is something 
which, even belonging to a swarm of entities of the same 
species, can be identified as being that individual, a nu-
merically singular thing we can identify in other situations 
where we find it (put another way, it can be identified as 
being that object in all possible words). An individual can 
bear a name, a label, something that can be used to refer 
to it without confusion in whatever context. In general, we 
don’t look for a “definition” of the concept, but take it as 
primitive and ask what confers an individual its individu-
ality instead, looking for some Principle of Individuation. 
Philosophy has presented us a lot of different answers we 
will not revise here (see Quinton, 1973).
Just to sum up, we recall that most of the answers fall 
in one of the two general schemas, namely, the theories 
which admit a form of substratum and those which reject 
this idea, the bundle theories. Saying in brief, according to 
the former, that what confers individuality to an individual 
is something over and above its qualities, or properties, 
while the last ones accept that an individual is to be 
identified with the collection its properties: it is a bundle 
of properties. Both views have problems: the first ones 
need to specify the nature of this substratum, while the 
last ones encounter difficulties with logic, for we may ask 
whether it can be possible for “two” individuals to have 
exactly the same set of properties. The well known answer 
given by Leibniz was expressed by his Principle of the 
Identity of Indiscernibles: if “two” entities have the same 
properties (are indiscernible), then they are the very same 
object, they are identical, and there are no “two” of them, 
but only one. Classical logic and standard mathematics 
incorporate this principle from one way or another, so 
that all theories found on such a ground are in principle 
Leibnizian in this sense. A wide discussion on these issues 
is given in French & Krause, 2006.
Quantum physics has been the realm par excellence where 
non individual entities do appear. Let us use the expression 
non-individual to refer to a kind of entity that, although 

















































being able to participate as an element of a swarm of 
entities of the same species, has no numerical identity, 
cannot e identified by a label or by a name. Quantum 
objects, the typical case being those of bosons, are entities 
of this kind. Roughly speaking, they are so that if an object 
of this kind is substituted by another of the similar kind, 
nothing physically relevant will be detected (Bose-Einstein 
statistics). Note that the situation here is distinct, say, from 
that where we are observing an ant and then she enters in 
the ants’ nest joining other ants of the same species, and 
we are no more able to identify it. But, in this case, we can 
for instance paint the ant with a small mark of ink, so that, 
even entering in the nest, when arising from it again we 
have the grounds for saying that that ant is “our” ant. Con-
cerning elementary quantum objects, in a time when we 
still did not trap particles, it was claimed by Schrödinger 
that “we cannot mark an electron, we cannot paint it red” 
(Schrödinger, 1953). Quantum objects apparently are of a 
distinct nature from their “classical” twins. They would not 
have identity. Are there ontologically different? Have they 
identity, as Priscilla apparently has?
According to standard quantum mechanics, two quantum 
objects, when interacting, may enter in superstition, and 
then no identification is any more possible. Some people 
say that their individuality is lost. The story of this non-
individuality entered in physics when Planck, n deriving his 
radiation law, admitted the distribution of indistinguish-
able non-individual quanta over oscillators. In 1926, Born, 
while defending the corpuscular as opposed to wave-like 
conception, acknowledged that these corpuscles could not 
be identified as individuals. In the same year, Heisenberg 
noted that Einstein’s theory of the ideal quantum gas 
implies that the “individuality of the corpuscle is lost” 
(for historical details, see French & Krause, 2006, 85ff). 
Weyl and Schrödinger were other important thinkers who 
defended the non-individuality of elementary “particles”. 
Schrödinger was so inclined to deny the identification of 
these objects (elementary particles) that suggested that 
the concept of identity cannot be applied to them (French 
& Krause, 2006).
In a series of works, we have pushed this idea that identity 
is meaningless to some entities to the development of 
logic-mathematical systems where expressions like x = y 
(so as its negation, ¬(x = y)) are not a well formed formu-
las (where x and y are individual variables ranging over 
non-individuals) to higher order logics and to a theory of 
collections of these objects, termed quasi-set theory (see 
French & Krause, 2006, for all the motivation, history and 
technical details). The reason for this choice was first to 
pursue Schrödinger’s claims mentioned above and, further, 
to avoid that the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, 
write in the language of second order logic as ∀x ∀y (∀F 
(F (x) ↔ F (y)) → x=y), results to be a theorem of the 
considered logic. In fact, if among the properties of an 
object a we consider that defined as Ia(x) =def x = a, which 
we can call “to be identical to a”, then if b partake with 
a all its properties (that is, if a and b are indiscernible), 
then it it has in particular that property, hence b=a and 
there are no “two” objects, but only one, which can be 
referred to by either a or b (they turn to be identical, the 
same object).
Even if we consider extensional set theory, identity is de-
fined so that a = b if and only if they have the same ele-
ments and (if there are Urelemente), if and only if they 
belong to the same sets, that is, if they are indiscernible. 
First order logic cannot specify identity completely, in the 
sense that there exist non normal structures which are el-
ementary equivalent to a normal model. A normal model is 
one whose the primitive predicate of identity is interpreted 
in the diagonal of the domain (the relation of identity of 
the model) –for details, see Mendelson, 1989, 100. Thus, 
we can say that non-individuals are those entities to which 
the predicate of identity is not defined, in particular, we 
don’t have a = a if a is a non-individual. Hence, they fail 
to obey the classical theory of identity.
But, within standard mathematics (without loss of gen-
erality, we can assume that all we shall consider can be 
developed in the first order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory 
encompassing the Axiom of Foundation, ZF), every object 
is an individual. In fact, take a and b. Then we can always 
form the singleton {a}, and x ∈ {a} if and only if x = a, 
that is, if and only if x is identical to a. In extensional 
contexts, we can regard x ∈ {a} as the definition of the 
predicate Ia(x). Then, if a and b are distinct, it is false that 
Ia(b), so they are distinguished by at least one “property”, 
and Leibniz’s principle holds. The usual way of consider-
ing indiscernible objects within “classical” frameworks is 
to work with structures embedded in the well founded 
universe of ZF, called V. As it is well known, V, as a struc-
ture, is rigid, that is, its only automorphism is the identity 









function. But we can construct structures which are not 
rigid in this sense. Then, we say that two objects a and b 
of the domain of one of such structures are indiscernible 
(form the point of view of the structure) if and only if there 
is an automorphism h of this structure such that h(a) = b. 
For example, 2 and –2 are indiscernible relatively to the 
structure E = 〈Z, +〉, formed by the set Z of the integers 
and the addition of integers, whose only automorphisms 
are the identity function and h(x) = –x.
This is more or less what happens in the formalism of 
quantum theory. In order to say that, say, two bosons are 
indiscernible, we take the join system as described by a 
symmetric vector (or a wavefunction) which is invariant 
by any exchanging of their coordinates. That is, they are 
invariant by permutations. These symmetry conditions are 
essential part of the quantum formalism. But, in ZF, we 
can prove that any structure (built in ZF) can be extended 
to a rigid structure. That is, by adding adequate objects, 
relations, and operations to the structure, we can obtain 
a rigid one; for instance, add to E above all singletons of 
the elements of Z, getting E ’ = 〈Z, +, {0}, {1}, {–1}, {2}, 
{–2}, ...〉, which is rigid, as it is easy to see. In short, the 
way of considering indiscernible objects within standard 
mathematics (and logic) is by means of some trick: we 
take individuals first, identified by their names, coordinates 
–which is the same– or by descriptions, and then we intro-
duce some device (like symmetry postulates) which makes 
them (artificially) indiscernible. But, let us emphasize, in 
the whole ZF they are individuals, and can always be iden-
tified as such. There is no way: as we said, classical logic 
and mathematics are Leibnizian.
These considerations have importance for the philosophi-
cal foundations of quantum theory. We can treat quantum 
objects as individuals, on a pair with their “classical” coun-
terparts (described by classical physics), but at the expens-
es of restricting the states and set of observable available 
to them (French & Redhead, 1998, French & Krause, 2006). 
But, in this case, their individuality must be ascribed by 
some kind of substratum (French & Redhead, 1998, French 
& Krause, 2006), so we enter in the realm of substratum 
theories, and metaphysics becomes complicated. Bohm’s 
theory, as it is well known, does that by assuming that 
quantum objects are individuals (like “classical particles”), 
but the dynamics has, beyond the Schrödinger equation, 
a “guiding equation”, which depend on the coordinates of 
the particles (see Goldstein, 2006). This shows that the 
mentioned trick is still present: we have individuals in the 
start, but the formalism will provide the way of treating 
them as they were not or, as in this case, as if they have the 
typical properties of non-individuals. Why not to search for 
a right way of describing them “directly”?
These are of course interesting topics, but let us end this 
digression and go back to our point. Can we say that the 
claim that we can name a quantum object, put it in a jail, 
isolate it, makes this object an individual? Let us address 
to this question next.
2.  TRAPPING QUANTUM OBJECTS
The Nobel laureate (1989) Hans Dehmelt has developed an 
important work in trapping quantum objects, something 
which nowadays has been used in quantum computation. 
In particular, Dehmelt trapped a positron (the anti-particle 
of the electron) by three months, and called it “Priscilla”. 
He has also trapped other objects, like a barium ion which 
was named “Astrid”, but we shall be fixed here in consi-
dering Priscilla. Dehmelt says: “[t]here can be little doubt 
about the identity of Priscilla during this period, since in 
ultrahigh vacuum she never had a chance to trade places 
with a passing antimatter twin. The well-defined identity of 
this elementary particles is something fundamentally new, 
which deserves to be recognized by being given a name, as 
pets are give names of persons” (Dehmelt, 1990 - see also 
Dehmelt, 1989, Heppenheimer, 1994). The technical details 
do not important us here, but just the fact that, according 
to Dehmelt, Priscilla has individuality, is an individual.
Why Priscilla would be an individual? The obvious answer 
goes in saying that we can point to a trap at Dehmelt’s 
laboratory and say: “that’s Priscilla, inside the trap”. The 
fact that Priscilla has a name, a well located position in 
the laboratory, in a way that it cannot interact with other 
objects of the same kind, makes it an individual. At least 
it seems. But we need first to identify the trap, which we 
do by considering the various asymmetries there are in the 
laboratory. But let us suppose that Dehmelt receives the 
visit of a colleague from another university and that we 
showed Priscilla to him as described above: he comes close 
to the trap and says “That’s Priscilla!”. But suppose that 

















































Dehmelt is just discussing the philosophical point we are 
concerned here (it would be wonderful if he did it) with his 
students, and commanded them to cancel the experience 
(so eliminating the positron) and making it again, in order 
to discuss with them if the “new” trapped positron will 
have any difference to Priscilla. But the students, typically, 
resolve to do nothing: “Prof. Dehmelt will not perceive the 
difference between the two positrons”, says one of them. 
Are they right? We think they are. There are no difference 
between positrons, except that one of then is here and now 
in a certain trap we are just looking at.
Thus, we may say that it is a certain spatio-temporal 
location that makes Priscilla an individual, being the only 
property we can ascribe to her which is not partaken by 
any other quantum object. But this is also not sufficient. 
Leaving aside the difficult problem of specifying the nature 
of the concepts of space and time in this assertion (say: are 
they those of Newtonian mechanics or are they relativist 
ones?), we can show the inadequacy of this proposal alter-
natively. In fact, suppose there are two quite similar traps 
in Dehmelt’s laboratory (suppose this is possible without 
further consideration about the individuality of the traps, 
another difficult problem, as it is well known), both with 
a positron trapped in. Which one is Priscilla? Well, you can 
say: that one in the trap near the window. But suppose De-
hmelt is absent from his laboratory for a moment, during 
which the students exchange the traps one another, and 
leave the light sufficiently weak so that Dehmelt doesn’t 
perceive the new configuration of his laboratory. Then the 
students ask him: where is Priscilla? For sure Dehmelt will 
point to the trap near the window and say: “She’s there!”. 
Without a careful analysis of the trap (not the positron), 
he cannot distinguish between the two positrons. Only by 
distinguishing between the traps, by noticing that they 
were changed, Dehmelt will be able to say that Priscilla is 
not that positron, but the another one.
Furthermore, suppose that Dehmelt ended his experiment, 
which resulted in trapping Priscilla, not on March, 14 1975 
(I don’t know the exact date: mines are fictitious), but on 
April, 13 1975. Of course he could call Priscilla that positron 
of April, 13. Can we say that it would be any difference for 
the scientific community? Of course not, although we can-
not prove that the positron of March, 14 and the positron 
of April, 13 are the very same object. This claim seems to 
have no sense at all. Positrons do not have individuality, 
they are not individuals (of course there are difficulties also 
concerning macroscopic objects, as Hume has emphasized, 
but we shall not touch this point here too).
3.  THE USE OF NAMES
Finally, let us address some remarks to the use of names 
in the quantum realm (for further details, see French & 
Krause, 2006, chap.5 -see also Dalla Chiara, 1985, To-
raldo di Francia, 1986). Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia 
have claimed that microphysics “is the land of anonymity” 
(1993), where there are no proper names, and any identi-
fication we made of a quantum object provides it only a 
“mock individuality”, having “very brief duration”. Of course 
Dehmelt’s experiences can be included in this description, 
if we relax the “brief duration” to three months. After that 
period, Priscilla cannot be identified any more (sometimes 
the object does not exist any more!), and can be remem-
bered only by reference of being the object which some 
day was in that trap, and not by some peculiar property of 
itself, which does not make reference to this fact.
Concerning names, the philosophical literature distinguish-
es between two main uses of names in science: the non-
descriptivist (or referential) use and the descriptivist use. 
A name, used in the non-descriptivist sense, just labels, or 
“tags”, its bearer, having no other meaning than to stand 
for the object it names. Its meaning is entirely given by its 
reference. As famously put by Stuart Mill, a proper name 
has denotation, but not connotation. A kind term like “ser-
pent”, on the contrary, has both denotation, since it can be 
used to refer to a specific reptile, and connotation, for it 
may be used also to mean “danger” or “treason” (see ibid.). 
According to this view, names refer for they are attached 
to the object as a person’s name is assigned to her at birth. 
Of course this use of names is not free from difficulties, we 
shall not discuss here (see French & Krause, 2006, chap. 5). 
Thus, in a non-descriptivist view, “Priscilla” is just the name 
of that positron trapped by Dehmelt some time ago, and its 
meaning is its reference, given by ostension.
In the descriptivist use, names refer by virtue of the de-
scriptive content associated with the name. This content is 
usually specified by a definite description satisfied by the 
object answering to that name. Thus, associated to “Pris-









cilla”, there is also a definite description like “the positron 
trapped in Dehmelt’s laboratory”. So, in order this kind of 
use of names work, we need to provide the grounds for 
showing that the description has being uniquely picked out 
by the object referred to. Let us be more specific on this 
point. Writing P(x) for “to be a positron” and D (x) for “is 
trapped in Dahmelt laboratory”, the above description can 
be written D(ιxP(x)) in the usual notation of the theory of 
descriptions, which according to Russell can be translated 
to ∃x (P (x) ∧ ∀y (P (y) → y = x) ∧ D (x)). Hence, we need 
to prove that Priscilla is the only positron trapped in Deh-
melt’s laboratory, and we cannot do that since we have not 
an adequate theory of identity for positrons –really, what 
means y = x in what respect positrons, or other quantum 
objects? We hope that the above argumentation has set-
tled this point, with the cases involving the exchange of 
traps, and with the possible repetition of the experiment.
How to understand “Priscilla” and Priscilla, trapped by 
Dehmelt? Priscilla is a quantum object, and as such, has 
its properties, or characteristics, prescribed by physical law. 
As Toraldo di Francia has put, it is a nomological object 
(1981, 222; Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia, 1993). All 
positrons have the same prescribed characteristics, and 
a particular location of one of them is to be understood 
as something which gives it only a mock individuality, as 
referred to above. Despite being trapped by three months, 
the case of Priscilla is like that of two similar quantum 
objects which go apart to a sufficient distance to be dis-
tinguished (say in a Wilson Chamber), although what we 
observe in a Wilson Chamber are not the particles them-
selves, but drops of supersaturated water vapor arranged 
along definite tracks, which make us conclude that the 
tacks were formed by quantum objects passing at high 
speeds (Heisenberg, 1949, 4). But these objects, when suf-
ficiently closer, enter in superposition and, even after a 
possible later depart, we cannot say anymore which is 
which. Al of this is well known from the technical point 
of view. The difficult task is to explain that, and hence we 
shall turn to the understanding of “Priscilla”.
We think that we ought to distinguish between two lan-
guages we normally use in physics: let us call them the 
object language, which is the language of the formalism 
proper, in which we express the theory’s concepts and 
principles, and the metalanguage, where we interpret the 
object language in order to make assertions about the 
facts described by the theory and communicate the results. 
The differences between these languages help us here, 
and something written by George Berkeley at §51 of his A 
Treatise Concerning Human Knowledge also applies here; 
as he said, “we ought to “think with the learned, and speak 
with the vulgar’.” Our vulgar metalanguage encompasses 
names and all other resources we find necessary to a better 
understanding of the achieved results and to communicate 
them, while the language proper we use to think about 
quantum physics is purely mathematical. In this “learned”, 
object language, there should be no names at all (at least 
according to a reasonable interpretation of quantum for-
malism which sees quantum objects as non-individuals). 
Thus, “Priscilla” makes part of the vulgar language, to use 
Berkeley’s term, but cannot be incorporated to the forma-
lism without making great and sometimes difficult restric-
tions. It is simply a word we use to tell to our friends that 
something was done in the laboratory, but cannot serve to 
provide the grounds that we have trapped an individual. 
Schrödinger himself has also addressed to this use of an 
“inadequate language” to express facts which are alien 
to the real state of affairs, when said that the language 
we normally use to speak about quantum objects, taken 
from classical physics, “constantly drives our mind to ask 
for information which has obviously no significance. Its 
imaginative structure exhibits features which are alien 
to the real particle” (Schrödinger, 1957, 204). After this 
argumentation, we hope the reader can for his/her own 
opinion.
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